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THE DIVERSITY OF
DEBT CRISES IN EUROPE
JEROME L. STEIN*
The external debts of the European countries are at
the core of the current crises. Generally, the crises are
attributed to government budget deficits in excess of
the values stated in the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP), and the Maastricht Treaty. Proposals for
reform involve increasing the powers of the European
Union to monitor fiscal policies of the national gov-
ernments and increasing bank regulation. I explain
the inter-country differences in the debt crisis in
Europe. The SGP and the EU focused upon rules
concerning government debt ratios and deficit ratios.
They ignored the causes of external debt ratios in the
entire economy that led to a crisis in the financial
markets.
My basic questions in the European context are: how
were ‘excessive/non sustainable’ external debt ratios
produced in the various countries? Were the crises due
to government budget deficits/government dissaving
or to the private investment less private saving? What
is the mechanism whereby the actions of the public
and private sectors lead to an unsustainable debt bur-
den, defined as an unsustainable ratio of debt ser-
vice/GDP? The answers determine to a large extent
how one should evaluate proposals for economic
reform, to avert future crises.
The external debt ratio is not a control variable, but is
an endogenous variable that is determined by ‘funda-
mentals’ in a dynamic manner. The fundamentals are
determined by the actions of both the public and the
private sectors. I explain this by drawing upon the
Natural Real Exchange Rate NATREX model of the
equilibrium real exchange rate and external debt – the
endogenous variables.
I start by presenting some relevant basic statistics.
They strongly suggest the inter-country differences
that caused the debt crisis. The government sector was
the main cause in Greece and Portugal. The private
sector was the main cause in Ireland and Spain.1
Basic statistics related to the origins of the crises 
Table 1 presents the ‘government structural balance’
as a percentage of potential GDP (SBGDP). It refers
to the general government cyclically adjusted balance
adjusted for nonstructural elements beyond the eco-
nomic cycle. The last row contains the mean and stan-
dard deviation in the pre-crisis period 1998–2007. In
Greece and Portugal the SBGDP have been on aver-
age twice as high as in the euro area, whereas in Spain
the SBGDP have been significantly lower and in
Ireland they have been similar to the euro area. A dif-
ference between Spain and Ireland is that, from
2001–2007, the structural budget deficits in Ireland
increased significantly, but were relatively stable in
Spain.
Current account/GDP, origins of the external debt
ratio 
The relevant debt is the external debt, and a crisis
occurs when the debt service payments/GDP are
unsustainable. The sources of the external debt are
current account deficits. Country experiences were
different concerning the causes of the current account
deficits. 
Table 2 describes the current account/GDP in the
euro area and in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. The net external debt is the sum of current
account deficits. The steady trend in government
deficits in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Ireland led to
a steady trend of current account deficits and exter-
nal debt. In Ireland and Spain, the rise in the
demand for housing/non-tradables since 2004 dis-
cussed below were additional factors that appreciat-
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ed the real exchange rate and generated the current
account deficits.
Table 3 describes the net external debt/GDP and the
general government external debt/GDP, as of the
end of 2009. The net external debt/GDP in column 1
is the key to understanding the crises in Europe. It is
equal to total public and private liabilities to for-
eigners and public and private claims on foreigners.
Column 2 is the general government net external
debt/GDP. 
Looking at Germany one sees the difference between
the two measures. Germany is a net creditor concern-
Table 1  
Government structural balance as % GDP (SBGDP) 
 Eurozone  Spain  Ireland  Portugal  Greece  Italy 
1998  – 2.03  – 1.736  1.219  – 3.4  – 2.86  – 3.1 
1999  – 1.6  – 1.02  0.269  – 3.38  – 1.89  – 1.8 
2000  – 1.969  – 1.22  1.673  – 4.7  – 2.68  – 0.9 
2001  – 2.676  – 1.757  – 1.8  – 5.5  – 3.647  – 3.1 
2002  – 2.86  – 1.1  – 2.757  – 4.9  – 4.1  – 3.0 
2003  – 3.1  – 0.976  – 3.167  – 4.89  – 6.03  – 3.5 
2004  – 2.98  – 0.978  – 2.75  – 5.2  – 8.638  – 3.6 
2005  – 2.67  – 1.598  – 3.756  – 5.7  – 6.01  – 4.4 
2006  – 2.07  – 1.275  – 4.0  – 3.9  – 4.9  – 3.3 
2007  – 1.83  – 1.132  – 7.3  – 3.4  – 6.795  – 1.5 















Sources: EconStats, IMF World Economic Outlook; Italy, Federal Reserve St. Louis, International Economic 
trends, Government budget balance/GDP. 
 
Table 3  
External debt position, end of 2009 
Country  Net external debt/GDP  
(in %) 
General government net external debt/GDP 
(in %) 
Portugal     88.6  74.4 
Greece     82.5  78.9 
Spain     80.6  47.3 
Ireland     75.1  70.6 
Italy     37.3  42.9 
Germany –  21.7  48.5 
Source: Cabral (2010). Negative value is creditor. 
Table 2  
Current account/GDP 
Year Eurozone  Greece  Ireland Spain  Italy Portugal 
1998    – 2.8  0.8  – 1.2  1.6  – 6.8 
1999  – 0.59  – 5.6  0.3  – 2.9  0.7  – 8.8 
2000  – 1.35  – 7.8  – 0.4  – 4.0  – 0.5  – 10.4 
2001  – 1.06  – 7.3  – 0.6  – 3.9  – 0.1  – 10.3 
2002  0.66  – 6.8  – 1.0  – 3.3  – 0.8  – 8.23 
2003  – 0.08  – 6.5  0.0  – 3.5  – 1.3  – 6.4 
2004  0.78  – 5.8  – 0.6  – 5.3  – 0.9  – 8.3 
2005  0.02  – 7.6  – 3.5  – 7.4  – 1.7  – 10.3 
2006  – 0.56  – 11.3  – 3.6  – 9.0  – 2.6  – 10.7 
2007  0.13  – 14.5  – 5.3  – 10.0  – 2.4  – 10.4 
2008  – 1.83  – 14.7  – 5.6  – 9.7  – 2.9  – 12.6 
2009  – 1.24  – 11.4  – 3.0  – 5.5  – 2.1  – 10.2 
2010  – 0.81  – 10.5  – 0.3  – 5.5  – 3.5   
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, International Economic Trends; Portugal, World Bank. CESifo Forum 4/2011 46
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ing the net external debt, whereas it has a general gov-
ernment net debt/GDP similar to Spain and higher
than Italy. For Portugal, Greece and Ireland, most of
the external debt is accounted for by government
debt. However, for Spain the gap between the two is
large. Therefore, the exclusive focus upon the govern-
ment sector is misleading. Italy does not have a high
net external debt/GDP. 
The low world rates of interest and high domestic
economic growth led to a rise in housing prices. In
the period 1991–2000 the growth rates in Ireland
and Spain were very high, and generated a boom in
housing prices. Thus the demand for non-tradables
rose, appreciating the real exchange rate – the ratio
of domestic/foreign prices – inducing a current
account deficit financed by capital inflows and the
external debt burden rose.
The capital market assumed that, since these coun-
tries are in the euro area, there is neither an exchange
rate risk nor a default risk. The capital market treated
these countries alike insofar as interest rates were con-
cerned, and did not charge countries a risk premium
relative to the rest of the euro area during the period
2000–2008. 
Repercussions in financial markets
It is difficult to separate bank debt from government
debt when the governments have bailed out banks.
The government/taxpayer takes over the role of the
debtor. There is reason to combine the two debtors.
Table 4 displays the debts of the banks and govern-
ments. Debtor is listed in row and creditor in column.
The major debtors were Italy, Spain and Ireland.
Spain owed 220 billion US dollars to the French and
238 billion US dollars to the Germans. The major
creditors were the French, German and British banks.
The major creditors for Ireland were Britain and
Germany. Last column is total debt to all countries in
addition to those in the table.
When the crises occurred in Greece, Portugal, Ireland
and Spain, whether due to the government or the pri-
vate sector, defaults occurred or were threatened. If
Spain defaulted then assets of the British, French and
German banks/government declined in value. If the
Irish defaulted, the British and German banks/gov-
ernments were affected. If Italy defaulted, the French
and German banks would be affected.
NATREX model of external debt and real exchange
rate2
The crucial variable leading to a debt crisis is the net
external debt/GDP. It is the sum of current account
deficits. The accounting identity is: current account
= (private saving less private investment) + govern-
ment saving. The first term in parenthesis refers to
the private sector and the second to the government
sector. The exclusive focus of the SGP upon the gov-
ernment debt and deficit is misleading – as the
recent crises indicated. The case of each country is
different. 
The external debt is an endogenous variable that
depends upon ‘economic fundamentals’. I present the
Natural Real Exchange Rate Model (NATREX) con-
cerning the simultaneous evolution of the endogenous
variables: the real exchange rate – the ratio of domes-
tic/foreign prices – and the external debt. The ‘funda-
mentals’ are: (a) the expenditures on non-tradables
that may arise from either the government budget bal-
Table 4 
Banks and governments: debtor and creditor by country (in billion US dollars) 
 Greece  Ireland  Italy  Spain  Portugal  Britain  France  Germany  Total 
debt 
Greece –  8.5  6.9  1.3  9.7  15  75  45  236 
Ireland 0.8  –  18  16 22  188  60  184  867 
Italy 0.7  46  –  47  5.2  77  511  190  1,400 
Spain 0.4  30  31  –  28  114  220  238  1,100 
Portugal 0.1 5.4 6.7 86    24  45  47 286 
Britain                  
France                  
Germany                 
Total 2  89.9  62.6  150.3  64.9  418  911  704   
Source: Fidelity Investments, Strategic Advisers, 2010. Row is debtor and column is creditor. 
2 The NATREX model is based upon Stein (2006, chapter 4).CESifo Forum 4/2011 47
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ance or expenditures by the private sector such as
occurred in the house price bubble; and (b) the pro-
ductivity of the economy that increases the current
account, by increasing the output of tradables. In the
case (a) the external debt rises from the medium to the
long run; and the real exchange rate first appreciates
and then depreciates below its initial level. In case (b),
the real exchange rate appreciates from the medium to
the longer run. The external debt first rises and then
declines steadily in the long run to a level below the
initial value.
I apply the NATREX model to explain the diversity
of debt crises in the European countries. In the empir-
ical part, I explain the relative roles of the different
fundamentals in the various European countries.
Equilibrium exchange rates and external debt
The equilibrium real exchange rate and external debt
interact in a dynamic manner. NATREX analysis
concerns the equilibrium real exchange rate and is not
the actual real exchange rate. The NATREX explains
the fundamental determinants of the medium-run
equilibrium and the dynamic trajectory of the real
exchange rate and the external debt to the long-run
equilibrium. In both the medium run and longer run
the NATREX equilibrium real exchange rate satisfies
equation (1), subject to constraints. The constraints
are that there is internal balance, where the rate of
capacity utilization is at its longer-term mean, and
external balance where the real rates of interest at
home and abroad are equal, there are neither changes
in reserves, nor speculative capital flows based upon
anticipations. The equilibrium real exchange rate is
the mean of a distribution, which is based upon real
fundamentals. The mean will vary over time due to
endogenous changes in capital and external debt, as
well as changes in the exogenous real fundamentals.
Deviations from this mean are produced by specula-
tive factors involving anticipations, cyclical factors,
lags in adjustment, and interest rate differentials.
These disequilibrium elements average out to zero.
These deviations produce considerable variation but
their effects are ephemeral. 
The terms in (1) are that investment less saving (It –S t)
plus the current account is equal to zero. Investment
less saving is the non-speculative capital inflow. The
current account (Bt –r tFt) is the trade balance Bt less
transfers of interest and dividends rtFt. The net exter-
nal debt is Ft and rt is the ‘interest/dividend’ rate. The
international investment position consists of equity,
portfolio investment and direct investment. The debt
Ft is the negative of the net international investment
position. Measure investment, saving and the debt as
fractions of the GDP.
[(It –S t) + (Bt –r tFt)] = 0 (1)
In the NATREX approach the endogenous current
account generates an evolving external debt, which
feeds back into the medium-run equation (1). A tra-
jectory to longer-run equilibrium is generated. The
dynamics of the debt/GDP ratio Ft is equation (2),
where g is the growth rate. The current account deficit
is the change in the external debt. The real exchange
rate affects the trade balance B in equation (1), and
the trade balance affects the evolution of the actual
debt ratio in equation (2). There is a dynamic interac-
tion between the endogenous real exchange rate and
debt ratio.
dFt /dt = (It –S t) – gtFt = (rtFt –B t) – gtFt
= (rt –g t )Ft –B t (2)
In the longer-run equilibrium, the debt ratio stabilizes
at a value that satisfies equation (3). The trade bal-
ance Bt is sufficient to finance the interest plus divi-
dend transfer on the debt net of growth (rt –g t)Ft. A
negative debt is net foreign assets.
(rt –g t)Ft –B t = 0. (3)
The longer-run equilibrium real exchange rate Rt* and
debt/GDP ratio Ft* are endogenous variables that sat-
isfy both equations (1) and (3). They are written as (4)
and (5) to indicate that they both depend upon the
real fundamentals Zt. 
Rt* = R(Zt) (4)
Ft* = F(Zt).( 5 )
I call dynamic stock-flow model equations (1) to (3)
the NATREX model, which is an acronym for the
Natural Real Exchange Rate. This is a model of posi-
tive economics. The derivation of the underlying equa-
tions is in Stein (2006, chapter 4). 
Populist and growth scenarios
The NATREX model is a technique of analysis. The
purpose of the model is to understand the effects of
policies and external disturbances upon the trajecto-
ries of the equilibrium real exchange rate Rt and equi-CESifo Forum 4/2011 48
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librium external debt ratio Ft ,which depend upon the
vector of fundamentals Zt. Insofar as the fundamen-
tals vary over time, the equilibrium real exchange rate
and external debt ratio will vary over time, as indicat-
ed in equations (4) and (5). The logic and insights of
the NATREX model can be summarized in two sce-
narios. Each scenario concerns different elements in
the vector Zt of the fundamentals, and has different
effects upon the equilibrium trajectories of the real
exchange rate NATREX and of the external debt.
This analysis will help understand the roles of the
government budget deficit and the housing price bub-
ble in generating external deficits. Table 5 summarizes
the differences between the two scenarios in the medi-
um and the long run.
The first scenario, called the Populist scenario,
involves a decrease in the ratio of social saving/GDP.
This could occur when (i) the government incurs
high-employment budget deficits, lowers tax rates
that raise consumption, or (ii) there is a rise in the
demand for non-tradable goods/housing. For exam-
ple, there are low interest rate loans for the produc-
tion of non-tradable goods. These scenarios repre-
sent a rise in the consumption ratio/a decline in the
saving ratio, a shift in the S function in equations (1)
and (2). These Populist expenditures are designed to
raise the standards of consumption/quality of life for
the present generation. 
The second scenario, called the Growth scenario,
involves policies designed to raise the productivity of
capital and increase the competitiveness of the econo-
my, increase the supply of traded goods. 
The stories behind the dynamics are as described by
Figures 1 and 2, and Table 5. Curve SI (Figure 1) is
saving less investment (S–I)(t). It is positively relat-
ed to the real exchange rate because a rise in domes  -
tic/foreign prices adversely affects investment (see
Stein 2006, chapter 4). The curve labeled CA(t) 
is the current account function (Bt –r tFt), which is
negatively related to the real exchange rate because
a rise in domestic/foreign prices adversely affects the
trade balance. Initial equilibrium is R = R(0) and
CA = 0.
The Populist scenario involves decreases in social
(public plus private) saving relative to the GDP. For
example, it involves an increase in demand for non-
tradables such as housing. External borrowing must
finance the difference between investment and sav-
ing. The SI function shifts from SI(0) to SI(1). The
new equilibrium is at [R(1), A(1)], where T = 1 de  -
notes the medium-run equilibrium. The real exchange
rate appreciates because the price of non-tradable
goods rises. The price of tradable goods is deter-
mined in the world market. The current account
deficit equal to A(1) is balanced by the capital
inflow. The debt rises, since the current account
deficit is the rate of change of the debt – equation
(2). Current account deficits lead to growing debt
service payments rtFt. 
The rise in the debt payments decreases the current
account function, shifts the curve CA from CA(0) to
CA(1). This Populist scenario is potentially dynami-
cally unstable because the increased debt raises the
current account deficit, which then increases the debt
further. The exchange rate then depreciates to R(2),
and since the current account deficit has risen to A(2),
and the debt rises steadily. The populist scenario – a
rise in the demand for non-tradables – is described in
Figure 2 and Table 5. The real exchange rate first
appreciates and then depreciates below its initial level.
The external debt rises steadily.
Table 5 
NATREX dynamics of exchange rate and external debt: two basic scenarios 
Scenarios 
R = real exchange rate = domestic/foreign prices, rise is 
appreciation, F = external debt/GDP; initial period T = 0, 
medium run T=1, long-run T=2.  
Derivation of all of the equations is in Stein (2006, ch. 4). 
 
Medium run 
T = 1 
 
Longer run 
T = 2 
Populist 
Rise in social in social consumption (time preference), rise in 
high employment government budget deficit, decline social 
saving, rise in demand for non-tradables 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
depreciation 
R(2) < R(0) < R(1) 
Debt rises 
F(2) > F(1) > F(0) 
Growth oriented 
Rise in productivity of investment. Rise in growth, rise in 
competitiveness, increase in trade balance function 
appreciation 
R(1) > R(0) 
Debt rises 
F(1) > F(0) 
appreciation 
R(2) > R(1) > R(0) 
Debt declines 
F(2) < F(0) < F(1) 
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Stability can only occur if the rise in the debt, which
lowers net worth equal to capital less debt, reduces
social consumption/raises social saving. Thereby, sav-
ing less investment rises. Long-run equilibrium (denot-
ed by T = 2) is reached at a higher debt F(2) > F(0)
and a depreciated real exchange rate R(2) < R(0). The
longer-run depreciation of the exchange rate R(2) <
R(0) can be understood from equation (3). Since the
debt is higher than initially, the trade balance B(2)
must be higher than initially to generate the foreign
exchange to service the higher transfers rtF(2). The
real exchange rate must depreciate to R(2) < R(0) in
order to raise the trade balance to B(2). 
The Growth scenario is summarized in the lower half
of Table 5. The perturbation is a rise in the produc-
tivity of investment in tradables. Investment rises
because of the rise in the rate of return. The difference
between investment and saving is financed by a capi-
tal inflow. The exchange rate appreciates to R(1) >
R(0) which reduces the trade balance and initially
produces a current account deficit. The current
account deficit equal to [I – S] raises the debt. The
trade deficit provides the resources to finance capital
formation, which raises the growth rate and the com-
petitiveness of the economy. 
The B function which relates the value of the trade
balance to the real exchange rate R increases with a
rise in the overall productivity/competitiveness of the
economy. For example, the reallocation of resources
leads to the production of higher quality/value goods
that can compete in the world market. The trajectory
to longer-run equilibrium differs from that in the
Populist scenario. The crucial aspect implied by the
Growth scenario is that the economy is more compet-
itive. At exchange rate R(1), the trade balance function
CA increases, shifts to the right. The real exchange rate
appreciates and there are now current account sur-
pluses, excess of saving over investment. As a result,
the debt then declines to a new equilibrium F(2) <
F(0). The trajectory of the debt is not monotonic. The
dynamic process in the Growth scenario is summa-
rized in the lower half of Table 5 The real exchange
rate appreciates steadily to a higher level R(2) > R(1)
> R(0). The external debt reaches a maximum and
then declines to F(2) < F(0) < F(1). 
NATREX analysis of the European situation
I analyze the European experiences within the frame-
work of the NATREX model. Summary data in
Table 6 shows that over the period 1998–2010 there
were large current account deficits in Greece, Portugal
and Spain, and lesser amounts in Ireland and Italy,
relative to the euro area. The external debts of these
countries rose due to current account deficits – as a
result of what the NATREX model calls a rise in time
preference: a decline in government saving and/or a
rise in demand for non-tradables.
The role of the government sector is described in
Table 6 by the row labeled Government balance. In
Greece, Portugal and Italy, the current account
deficits were produced by a rise in government con-
sumption/decline in government saving.
 
Figure 1 
SI AND CA CURVES
Note: Saving less investment is SI and current account is CA.
Decline in social saving shifts SI to SI(1). Real exchange rate appre-
ciates to R(1) and current account declines to A(1). The resulting rise
in debt shifts CA to CA(1). Real exchange rate depreciates to R(2)





Note: Rise in social consumption, increase demand for non-trad-
ables, generates trajectory R(t) and external debt trajectory F(t).
Initial R(0), F(0) at origin.
Source: Author’s conception.CESifo Forum 4/2011 50
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In Spain and Ireland, the government sector was not
the major cause of a decline in social saving/rise in
social consumption. Table 7 indicates the large capital
gains resulting from investment in housing/non-trad-
ables in Ireland and Spain, relative to the euro area.
The mean capital gain was: Ireland 13.3 percent,
Spain 9.71 percent and the euro area 5.16 percent.
Irish and Spanish banks borrowed abroad at low rates
of interest and loaned these funds to the housing
industry. The anticipated return was the marginal
product of capital plus the anticipated capital gain.
Investors within and without the euro area ignored
the default risk. Moreover they assumed that the cap-
ital gain could continue to exceed the mean rate of
interest. The rise in the house price index reflected the
increase in the demand for non-tradables (see Table 6,
row labeled House price appreciation). In Ireland,
Spain and Greece, there was a significant rise in the
demand for non-tradables.
The movement of the real exchange rate, equal to the
ratio of prices relative to the euro area, is reflected in
Table 6 by the row labeled GDP deflator. In all five
countries, both the government sector and the rise in
the demand for non-tradables by the private sector led
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, current
account deficits and the growth in the external debt
ratio dFt /dt. This is expressed in equation (2). The SI
curve shifted from SI(0) to SI(1) in Figure 1 changing
the medium-run equilibrium to [R(1), A(1)] from
[R(0), A(0) = 0]. The appreciation of the real
exchange rate, measured by the GDP deflator, was
higher in all five countries relative to the euro area.
The debt ratio stabilizes if the trade balance
B(R(t);Z(t)) is sufficiently large to earn the income
to service the debt, adjusted for growth. Since the
appreciation of the real exchange rate, the percent
change in the GDP deflator (relative to the euro),
Table 6  
Summary data 1998–2010 
 Euro  area  Greece  Ireland  Spain  Portugal  Italy 
Current 
account/GDP 
m = – 0.26 
sd = 0.85 
m = – 8.6 
sd = 3.5 
m = – 1.75 
s = 2.16 
m =  – 5.4 
s = 2.8 
m = – 9.45 
s = 1.78 
m = – 1.7 
s = 1.47 
Government 
balance 
m = – 2.38 
s = 0.54 
m = – 4.76 
s = 2.11 
m = – 2.24 
s = 2.7 
m = – 1.28 
s = 0.31 
m = – 4.5 
s = 0.09 





m = 5.16 
s = 1.97 
m = 10.1 
s = 3.8 
m = 13.3 
s = 7.24 
m = 9.71 
s = 5.43 
m = 3.3 
s = 2.8 
m = 5.11 
s = 3.7  
GDP deflator 
(% change) 
m = 1.7 
s = 0.59 
m = 3.23 
s = 0.84 
m = 2.45 
s = 3.21 
m = 3.1 
s = 1.35 
m = 2.67 
s = 1.04 
m = 2.35 
s = 0.72 
Growth 
(% change) 
m = 1.6 
s = 2.0 
m = 2.7 
s = 2.8 
m = 4.2 
s = 5.1 
m = 2.7 
s = 2.4 
m = 1.52 
s = 2.06 
m = 0.72 
s =2.14 
Source: Federal Reserve St. Louis, International Economic Trends. 
 
Table 7  
Residential property prices in EU countries, annual % change, new and existing houses 
 Germany  Ireland  Greece  Portugal  Spain  Italy  France  Euro  area 
1996  – 1.1  –   9.9  1.7  1.4  2.4  –   2.0 
1997  – 1.9  –   8.2  3.6  2.8  3.4  0.1  2.3 
1998  – 1.6  22.6  14.4  4.5  5.8  – 1.4  1.9  2.5 
1999 1.4  22.5  8.9 9  7.7  0.8  7.1  4.9 
2000 0.2  20.5  10.6  7.7  8.6  3.9  8.8  6 
2001 0.2  14.0  14.4  5.4  9.9  6.0  1.9  5.5 
2002 –  1.9 6.1  13.9 0.6  15.7  12.6  8.3  6.8 
2003 –  1.2  14.3 5.4 1.1  17.6  7.2  11.7  6.4 
2004 –  1.4  11.5 2.3 0.6  17.4  7.0  15.2  7.2 
2005 –  1.5 7.2  10.9 2.3  13.4  8.6  15.3  7.6 
2006 0.3  13.4  12.2  2.1  10.4  5.8  12.1  6.4 
2007 0.3  0.9 –    1.3  5.8  5.0  6.1  4.3 
Mean –  0.68 13.3 10.1  3.3 9.71 5.11  8.05  5.16 
Standard 
deviation 1.1  7.23  3.8  2.8 5.43  3.7 5.27  1.97 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Housing Statistics IFC Bulletin 31 Annex 1. CESifo Forum 4/2011 51
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was higher in all five countries, the trade balance
could not rise to service the debt. A necessary condi-
tion for the debt ratio to stabilize is that the real
exchange rate depreciates to increase the trade bal-
ance: see equation (3) above.
Table 8 shows that, in the last few years, there has
been some real exchange rate depreciation in
Ireland, but not in Greece and Italy. From Table 2,
one sees growing current account deficits in all of
the countries. 
Conclusions 
I use the NATREX model to explain the causes of the
rise in the external debt, generated by the current
account deficit. They were produced by both the gov-
ernment budget deficit and the rise in the demand for
non-tradable, which in turn appreciated the real
exchange rate. This is the movement to the medium
run equilibrium R(1), A(1) in Figure 1. Large budget
deficits do not have a 1-1 correspondence with an exter-
nal debt. The IMF analysis showed that the US cur-
rent account balance closely tracked the saving-invest-
ment balance of households, while the fiscal balance
showed little correlation (IMF 2011). The SGP rules
must be viewed in the context of the NATREX model
above.
No sustained improvement in the external debt can
occur unless the growth scenario occurs. Growth and
the trade balance function must increase. In the short-
er run, the real exchange rates of the five countries
must depreciate relative to the euro. It is problematic
if this is occurring. Bailouts and austerity policies will
be ineffective in reducing the growth of the debt
unless the trade balance function B(R(t)) increases
relative to the debt service (r – g)F(t). The right hand
side of equation (2) must decline.
The euro per se has not been adversely affected by the
debt crises of the five countries. The value of the euro-
US dollar depends upon the fundamentals, the two
scenarios, in both areas, not just in either one (see also
Stein 2006, chapter 5). The country crises are not a
euro crisis.
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Table 8  
GDP deflator, percent change from year ago 
 Euro  area  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain  Italy  US 
1998  1.0 5.2 6.6  3.79 2.5 2.7 1.1 
1999 1.6  3  4.1  3.29  2.6  1.8  1.5 
2000  1.3 3.4 6.1  3.24 3.5 1.9 2.2 
2001  2.4 3.1 5.5  3.57 4.2 2.9 2.3 
2002  2.6 3.4 4.5  3.73 4.3 3.3 1.6 
2003  2.2 3.9 2.8 3.0 4.1 3.1 2.2 
2004 1.9  3  2  2.46  4  2.6  2.8 
2005  2.0 2.8 2.5  2.51 4.3 2.1 3.3 
2006  1.9 3.1 3.8  2.77 4.1 1.8 3.3 
2007   2.4  3  1.1  3.18  3.3  2.6  2.9 
2008 2.1  3.5  –  1.4  1.58  2.4  2.8  2.2 
2009  1.0 1.3 –  4  0.545 0.6 2.3 0.9 
2010 0.8  3.3  –  1.7  0.98  0.4  0.6  1.0 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis, International Economic Trends, Eurostat. 
 